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Conservatives are more reluctant to give and receive apologies than liberals 
This paper examines the proposition that conservatives will be less willing than liberals to 
apologize, and less likely to forgive after receiving an apology. In Study 1, we found 
evidence for both relationships in a 9-nation survey. In Study 2, participants wrote an open-
ended response to a victim of a hypothetical transgression they had committed. More 
conservative participants were less likely to include apologetic elements in their response. 
We also tested two underlying mechanisms for the associations: social dominance orientation 
(SDO) and entity beliefs about human nature. SDO emerged as a stronger and more 
consistent mediator than entity beliefs. Apologies are theorized to be a rhetorical vehicle for 
removing power inequities in relationships post-transgression. Consistent with this 
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theorizing, it was those who are relatively high in commitment to equality (i.e., those high in 
liberal ideology and low in SDO) who are most likely to provide and reward apologies.  
 
KEYWORDS: apology; political ideology; conservatism; reconciliation; social dominance 
orientation  
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Conservatives are more reluctant to give and receive apologies than liberals 
 
During the 2016 race for Presidency of the United States, the Democrat nominee 
(Hillary Clinton) apologized five times in eight months: for using her private email server 
while secretary of state (September, 2015); for praising Nancy Reagan’s record on promoting 
HIV awareness (March, 2016), for supporting her husband’s 1994 crime bill (April, 2016), 
for using the phrase “off the reservation” (April, 2016), and for saying that she’d put the coal 
industry “out of business” (May, 2016). This contrasts with the Republican nominee who, 
when pressed on when he had last apologized, said “It was too many years ago to remember. 
I have one of the great memories of all time, but it was too long ago” (Donald Trump; 
August, 2015). 
Other Republicans elevated the reluctance to be apologetic to the status of a moral 
virtue or rallying cry. Henry Kissinger – Secretary of State for successive Republican 
administrations – once said “You are you and that is the beginning and the end – no 
apologies, no regrets.” In a similar vein, Ronald Reagan wrote “I hope that when you're my 
age, you'll be able to say as I have been able to say: We lived in freedom, we lived lives that 
were a statement, not an apology.” The book Mitt Romney released in the lead-up to the 2012 
election was titled No Apology. 
We presented these examples merely to lend a human face to a broader research 
question: Do different political ideologies predict willingness to deliver apologies (and 
willingness to accept apologies when they are received)? The question is consequential, 
because the presence of an apology is profoundly important for the forgiveness process. In a 
meta-analysis of 175 studies on interpersonal forgiveness (Fehr, Gelfand, & Nag, 2010), 
people were much more likely to forgive when the transgressor had apologized. Moreover, 
the effect size (r = .40) was comparable to other variables that are highly proximal to 
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forgiveness, such as harm severity (r = -.26), trait forgiveness (r = .34), and whether the 
transgression was intentional (r = .50). In short, apologies matter: they help heal relationships 
that have been threatened by a breach of trust. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that 
proclivity to apologize –an individual difference variable – is positively associated with a 
range of well-being indices (Howell, Dopko, Turowski, & Buro, 2011). Neither is it 
surprising that victims have strong emotional needs to receive apologies (Hornsey, Okimoto, 
& Wenzel, in press; Leunissen, de Cremer, Folmer, & van Dijke, 2013). 
Interestingly, research on proclivity to apologize has lagged well behind research on 
the effects of apologies. Existing research has focused on gender (Schumann & Ross, 2010) 
and the personality signatures of those with a proclivity to apologize (Dunlop, Lee, Ashton, 
Butcher, & Dykstra, 2015; Howell et al., 2011; Howell, Turowski, & Buro, 2012). However, 
there is no existing theorizing that has drawn a psychologically meaningful line between 
people’s political orientations and their willingness to apologize in interpersonal contexts.  
In this paper we make a case that conservatives will be more reluctant to give 
apologies than liberals, and less likely to reward apologies offered by others with forgiveness. 
We examine two variables that may help understand links between political conservatism and 
willingness to give and receive apologies: implicit theories about the malleability of human 
nature (entity beliefs; e.g., Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995) and ideological beliefs about power 
differentials (social dominance orientation; e.g., Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). 
We review the case for these pathways below. 
Entity beliefs. An apology, in essence, is a statement of transformation. Implicit in 
any apology – particularly for an intentional transgression – is the notion that the transgressor 
has changed: that the person who committed the transgressions has reflected on their nature, 
seen fault in it, and sought to repair it (Goffman, 1971). If one does not believe that 
personalities change – that is, if people have entity theories of human nature – then 
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apologizing (or accepting another’s apology) might seem empty or pointless. Consistent with 
this notion, Howell et al. (2011) found a modest but significant positive correlation between 
proclivity to apologize and the belief that people are amenable to change, while Schumann & 
Dweck (2014) found that people with entity theories of personality are less willing to accept 
responsibility for their transgressions. There is also evidence that people who hold entity 
theories about groups are less trusting following an interpersonal apology (Haselhuhn, 
Schweitzer, & Wood, 2010) and less forgiving in the face of intergroup apologies (Wohl et 
al., 2015). Finally, people who hold relatively conservative values are more likely to hold 
entity beliefs about human nature (Kahn et al., 2016). This suggests a mediated model, such 
that conservatives have more entity beliefs about human nature, and through this are less 
willing to apologize. People holding entity beliefs about human nature might also be less 
willing to forgive in the face of an apology, because the implicit promise of change would 
seem unconvincing (see Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006, for a discussion of the 
importance of the “promise to change” aspect of an apology).  
Social dominance orientation (SDO). Another relevant variable is people’s 
ideological beliefs about power hierarchies and equality. According to exchange theory, 
transgressions lead to disequilibrium in the relationship, with predictable downstream 
consequences in terms of negative affect. But the experience of remorse indicates that the 
offender is suffering pain, and as such apologies restore equity in the relationship, leading to 
a reduced need for additional punishment (Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009; Gold & Weiner, 
2000; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010; O’Malley & Greenberg, 1983). Reinforcing the emphasis on 
power differences, the needs-based model of reconciliation argues that transgressors and 
victims have different goals that they seek to achieve through the reconciliation process 
(Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Canetti-Nisim, & Ullrich, 2008). Transgressors’ 
primary motivation is to restore their moral image in the eyes of others. For victims, however, 
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the primary goal is to restore what has been taken away from them in terms of power, control, 
honor, and status. An apology is often cited in this literature as a prototypical example of a 
win-win event: it helps restore transgressor’s moral reputation, and at the same time restores 
victims’ power (Shnabel & Nadler, 2015).  
Central to both perspectives is the notion that apologies serve the function of reducing 
the power gulf between victims and transgressors. To the extent that people intuitively share 
this perspective, one might reasonably expect that their willingness to apologize is associated 
with broader ideologies about the desirability of equality. One construct relevant to our 
analysis is SDO (Pratto et al., 1994), which assesses people’s general orientation to the 
existence of societal hierarchies. People low in SDO see equality as a virtuous goal; to the 
extent that apologies are seen as equity-promoting rhetorical tools, low-SDO people might be 
relatively congenial to the notion of giving (and receiving) apologies. In contrast, people high 
in SDO tend to see power differences as normal, natural and unproblematic; as such, they 
may see less of a need to apologize, and may be less likely to reward others’ apologies with 
forgiveness.1 Given that there is a robust positive association between political conservatism 
and SDO (e.g., Ho et al., 2015), it again suggests an indirect path, such that conservatism is 
associated with negative attitudes towards apologies, mediated through SDO. 
STUDY 1 
 We conducted a survey study across 9 nations to provide the first test of whether 
people’s political ideologies are associated with their attitudes toward the giving (and 
receiving) of apologies. We predicted that participants identifying themselves as more 
conservative would be less willing to apologize. We also predicted that the link between 
political ideology and proclivity to apologize would be mediated through SDO and/or entity 
beliefs about human nature. 
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 In addition to measuring proclivity to apologize as a criterion variable, we measured 
the extent to which participants reported a greater proclivity to forgive upon receiving an 
apology. In line with the meta-analysis reported earlier (Fehr et al., 2010), we expected that 
forgiveness would be higher in the event of an apology. However, we predicted that this 
“apology bonus” would be greater among liberals than conservatives, an association that 
would be mediated through SDO and/or entity beliefs.  
 The decision to sample participants from nine nations reflects a determination to draw 
conclusions that translate beyond the Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic 
(WEIRD) samples that are already over-represented in the literature (Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010). Our goal was not to conduct a formal cross-cultural analysis, and we 
make no a priori predictions about whether results might be moderated by culture. However, 
for the sake of thoroughness, we also examined how the key variables vary as a function of 
the national sample. 
Method 
Participants and sampling 
Participants were community members recruited through online data collection 
companies (N = 2130, ns for each nation ranged from 211-287). Sample size was determined 
so that we would have sufficient power to test our model not just at the overall level, but also 
within each nation.  
Participants (51.2% female, Mage = 39.67 years, SD = 13.75) responded to an 
invitation to take part in a survey titled “Personal ideals and views.” We sampled from 
developed and developing countries spanning five continents: Australia, Chile, China, Hong 
Kong, India, Japan, Peru, Russia, and the USA. Questionnaires were translated into the native 
language of non-English speaking samples using translation/back-translation procedures. 
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Measures 
Entity beliefs were measured using a 3-item scale devised by Chiu, Hong, and Dweck 
(1997). An example item is “The kind of person someone is, is something very basic about 
them and it can't be changed very much” (1=very strongly disagree, 6=very strongly agree; 
α=.77). 
SDO was measured using a 4-item scale validated across an international sample 
(Pratto et al., 2013). Participants rated their support for four statements, including “Group 
equality should be our ideal” (reversed) and “Superior groups should dominate inferior 
groups” (1=extremely oppose, 10=extremely favor; α=.53).2  
Reluctance to apologize was measured using six items from the Proclivity to 
Apologize Measure (Howell et al., 2011). Example items include: “If I think no-one will 
know what I have done, I am likely not to apologize,” and “I don't apologize very often 
because I don’t like to admit that I’m wrong” (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree; α=.87).  
 To measure the apology-forgiveness bonus, participants were presented with three 
scenarios in which they had been transgressed against. In each case participants were asked 
“Do you think he or she should be forgiven?” which they answered using a sliding scale from 
0 (“never, regardless of the circumstances”) to 100 (“all the time, regardless of the 
circumstances”). Within each scenario the question was posed twice: first in the event that the 
transgressor does not apologize, and then again on the understanding that the person 
“apologizes and seems genuinely sorry.” The scenarios included a workplace transgression 
(“A work colleague loses their temper at you in front of other work colleagues”), a social 
transgression (“You find out that an acquaintance has been criticizing you behind your 
back”), and a romantic transgression (“Your partner cheats on you by sleeping with someone 
else”). Levels of forgiveness measured before (α=.84) and after (α=.75) being told that the 
transgressor had apologized were highly correlated across the three scenarios and so were 
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combined into separate scales of pre- and post-apology forgiveness. Apology bonus was 
calculated by subtracting the mean pre-apology forgiveness score from the mean post-
apology forgiveness score, such that higher scores reflected a greater forgiveness bonus for 
receiving an apology. 
Political ideology was measured by asking participants where they would place 
themselves on a scale of ‘left’ versus ‘right’ (1=left, 9=right) and ‘liberal’ versus 
‘conservative’ (1=very liberal, 9=very conservative). The two items were positively 
correlated (r=.33, p<.001) so were combined into a single scale of political conservatism.3 
Covariates. Five control variables were measured at the end: age, sex (1=male, 
2=female), income (1=much lower than the average national income, 5=much higher than the 
average national income), education (1=did not finish high score; 8=professional degree), and 
religiosity (1=not at all religious, 7=extremely religious),  
Results and Discussion 
 Means, standard deviations, and correlations among variables are presented in Table 
1. The mean for political ideology approximated the mid-point of the scale, indicating that the 
sample was not skewed politically (this was true within countries as well, with the mean 
political ideology scores ranging from 4.54 – 5.75). As expected, post-apology forgiveness 
levels (M=57.20, SD=24.00) were about one standard deviation higher than pre-apology 
forgiveness levels (M=35.01, SD=25.62), an effect that was highly significant, 
F(1,2086)=8893.42, p<.001, η2p=.81. 
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations Among Variables 
      Variable (and range)                   M     SD          2           3   4     5          
1. Political Conservatism (1-9) 5.09 (1.48) .27*** .18*** .24***   -.17*** 
2. SDO (1-10) 4.03 (1.58)  .21*** .35*** -.26**  
3. Entity Beliefs (1-6)  3.82 (0.99)   .35*** -.10*** 
4. Reluctance to Apologize (1-7) 3.30 (1.33)     -.28*** 
5. Apology Bonus (-100-100) 22.20  (21.61) 
Note: ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
 
 Correlations between the key variables were in line with predictions. Most 
importantly, the more conservative participants reported themselves to be, the more they 
expressed reluctance to apologize, and the less they reported an apology bonus in terms of 
forgiveness.  
As seen in Table 1, the proposed mediators (SDO and entity beliefs) were both 
associated with political conservatism, reluctance to apologize, and apology bonus. We 
conducted mediation analysis on the overall sample to test whether the relationship between 
political conservatism and reluctance to apologize occurred via SDO and entity beliefs. 
Mediation analysis was conducted using Hayes’ (2012) PROCESS computational model 
(Model 4 testing two mediators in parallel) with 10,000 bootstrapped samples and 95% 
confidence intervals. 
Figure 1 shows the unstandardized coefficients for each path. The indirect effects of 
political conservatism on reluctance to apologize through SDO (ab=0.06, SE=.07, CI95[.0499, 
.0775]) and entity beliefs (ab=0.04, SE=.07, CI95[.0310, .0595]) were both significant. In 
sum, the more conservative participants were, the more they endorsed both SDO and entity 
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beliefs, which then flowed through to a reluctance to apologize. It should be noted that the 
relationship between political conservatism and reluctance to apologize remained significant 
after including the mediators, suggesting partial mediation (b=0.10, SE=.02, t=5.53, 
CI95[.0665, .1397]). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1. Relationship between political conservatism and reluctance to apologize, 
mediated through SDO and entity beliefs. 
 
Note. All numbers are unstandardized coefficients. The number in parentheses is the 
direct effect after controlling for SDO and entity beliefs *** p<.001 
.21*** (.10***) 
.12*** .37*** 
Political 
Conservatism 
 
Entity 
Beliefs 
Reluctance to 
Apologize 
SDO 
.29*** .22*** 
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We repeated the analyses controlling for age, sex, income, education, and religiosity. 
When all predictors were included in the model, there was evidence that men and younger 
participants were relatively anti-apology (ps<.001). Of more relevance to our research 
question, indirect effects of political conservatism on reluctance to apologize through SDO 
(ab=0.06, SE=.01, CI95[.0482, .0770]) and entity beliefs (ab=0.03, SE=.01, CI95[.0222, 
.0492]) remained significant, and the relationship between political conservatism and 
reluctance to apologize remained significant even after including the mediators and 
covariates (b=0.09, SE=.02, t=4.87, CI95[.0560, .1316]).  
 A second set of analyses was conducted with apology bonus as the criterion variable 
(see Figure 2). The indirect link between political conservatism and apology bonus via SDO 
was significant (ab=-0.88, SE=.16, CI95[-1.1286, -0.6739]), but this time the parallel link via 
entity beliefs was not significant (ab=-0.10, SE=.06, CI95[-.2343, .0162]). In sum, the more 
conservative participants were, the more they were likely to endorse SDO beliefs, which was 
in turn associated with less of an apology bonus on forgiveness. Again, the relationship 
between political conservatism and apology bonus remained significant after including the 
mediators, suggesting partial mediation (b=-1.40, SE=.33, t=-4.26, p<.001, CI95[-2.0458, -
0.7585],).  
Inclusion of the covariates did not change the significant indirect link between 
political conservatism and apology bonus via SDO (ab=-0.90, SE=.12, CI95[-1.1508, -
0.6858]), or the non-significant link via entity beliefs (ab=-0.06, SE=.05, CI95[-.1706, 
.0391]). Even after including covariates and mediators, the direct effect of political ideology 
on apology bonus remained significant (b=-1.00, SE=.34, t=-2.90, p=.004, CI95[-1.6683, -
0.3222]).4 
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Cross-national analyses. Nation-level data are summarized in Figures 3 and 4. In line with 
expectations, countries that reported the highest levels of SDO and conservatism also tended 
to report the greatest reluctance to apologize and the lowest apology bonuses. As a check of 
the robustness of the results, we ran models separately for each of the nine nations. Of course 
the drop in N associated with conducting analyses within nation lowered the power of each 
analysis. However, the link between conservatism and reluctance to apologize emerged as 
significant in 7 of 9 nations (in Peru it was marginally significant; in Chile it was non-
significant). The indirect effect of SDO in mediating the link between political conservatism 
and reluctance to apologize remained significant in all but two nations (Japan and Russia). 
Furthermore, the role of SDO in helping explain the link between political conservatism and 
the apology bonus was significant in 6 nations: Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, 
and USA. In contrast, the indirect effect of political conservatism and reluctance to apologize 
through entity beliefs was only significant in India and the USA.   
SDO 
.29*** -3.05*** 
*** 
-2.40*** (-1.40***) 
.12*** -0.83 
Ϯ 
Political 
Conservatism 
Entity 
Beliefs 
Apology 
Bonus 
Figure 2. Relationship between political conservatism and apology bonus, mediated 
through SDO and entity beliefs. 
Note. All numbers are unstandardized coefficients. The number in parentheses is the 
direct effect after controlling for SDO and entity beliefs *** p<.001  Ϯ  p<.10   
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Figure 3. Nation-level data for reluctance to apologize and political conservatism (top graph) 
and SDO (bottom graph). 
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Figure 4. Nation-level data for apology bonus and political conservatism (top graph) and 
SDO (bottom graph). 
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STUDY 2 
 Although relatively consistent, the size of the relationship between political 
conservatism and proclivity to apologize in Study 1 ranged from small to moderate. 
Furthermore, it is unclear how much of the relationship could be explained by common 
method variance and pattern responding; methodological artifacts associated with the 
approach of correlating two self-report scales. To address this, we sought to replicate the 
main relationship between political orientation and proclivity to apologize, but this time 
operationalizing proclivity to apologize by coding open-ended responses.  
In Study 2, participants imagined they had committed a transgression toward a 
neighbor, and were asked to record what they would say to the neighbor in response. 
Consistent with Study 1, it was expected that more conservative participants would be less 
likely to use apologetic statements in their response than would relatively liberal participants. 
Given the inconsistent mediational evidence for the entity belief measure in Study 1, we 
again measured entity beliefs but this time with a different scale. 
Method 
Participants. Study 2 was conducted using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Eighty-three 
participants initially completed the study, but 5 left their open-ended response blank, and 13 
did not follow instructions (i.e., they either imagined themselves from the victim’s 
perspective or wrote something that was clearly not a response to the neighbor). This left 65 
usable participants (56.9% male; Mage=32.75), comprising 38 from India and 27 from the 
United States. 
Materials and Procedure. Participants first completed a number of individual differences 
scales, including a 3-item measure of entity beliefs adapted from Erdley and Dweck (1993; 
e.g., “Someone’s personality is a part of them that they can’t change very much”; 1=strongly 
disagree, 7=strongly agree; α=.96).5 Participants were then asked to imagine that they had 
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committed a transgression against a neighbor (by not watering their plants as frequently as 
promised, leaving the neighbor’s plants distressed) and to write down what they would say to 
the neighbor.6 Two assistants blind to hypothesis coded the responses for the presence (coded 
1) or absence (coded 0) of apologetic statements (e.g., I’m sorry or I apologize). Inter-rater 
reliability was high (kappa=.93); discrepancies were resolved through discussion.  
At the end of the study, participants recorded their demographic details, including 
political conservatism (1=extremely liberal; 7=extremely conservative) and the control 
variables of age, sex, nationality (measured as country of birth), and religiosity (measured as 
in Study 1). 
Results and Discussion 
 As predicted, the more conservative participants were, the less likely they used 
apologetic statements in their open-ended response (r=-.38, p=.002). This relationship 
remained significant after controlling for nationality, age, religiosity, and sex (rpartial=-.37, 
p=.004). 
 Although the main association documented in Study 1 proved robust in Study 2, the 
role of entity beliefs in explaining the association was not: entity beliefs did not significantly 
correlate with either political orientation (r=.21, p=.093) or apologetic statements (r=-.08, 
p=.51). This is despite the fact that the two cultures examined in this study – India and the 
USA – were the cultures in Study 1 for which there was robust evidence that entity beliefs 
played a role. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 This paper provides the first evidence that people are more reluctant to apologize if 
they are more politically conservative. Because there is a temptation to simplify and magnify 
differences between ideological categories, we want to put on the record that this does not 
mean that conservatives are anti-apology. In Study 1, scores on our reluctance to apologize 
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measure were generally below the mid-point, so the majority of our participants showed a 
proclivity to apologize, regardless of political orientation. But the data across both studies 
showed that this proclivity to apologize waned for participants who were more politically 
conservative. 
 Interestingly, in Study 1 politically conservative participants were also less influenced 
by apologies when determining whether a transgressor deserved forgiveness. Again, this is 
not to say that conservatives are unimpressed by apologies: forgiveness levels were much 
higher in the presence of an apology than in the absence of an apology, and this was the case 
for the vast majority of participants in our sample. But the data show that the “apology 
bonus” in terms of forgiveness is less pronounced for conservatives than for liberals. So not 
only are conservatives less likely to want to provide an apology than liberals, but they are 
also less likely to weight an apology when determining whether to forgive. 
  We do not wish to imply that there is an intrinsic moral virtue or psychological 
advantage in giving or accepting apologies. Elsewhere it has been argued that there is a 
downside to the normative expression of apologies as a default response to hurt (Okimoto, 
Wenzel, & Hornsey, 2015), and there is also a case to be made that it might be premature to 
forgive in the face of thoughtless or qualified apologies (e.g., Barlow et al., 2015). However 
it is undeniable that in general the proclivity to apologize is associated with positive well-
being (Howell et al., 2011) and that receiving apologies helps enable victims to move on 
(Fehr et al., 2010; Tavuchis, 1991). Forgiving transgressors is also associated with a range of 
positive consequences in terms of physical and psychological health (e.g., Exline & 
Baumeister, 2000; Wade, Hoyt, Kidwell, & Worthington, 2014). Given this, the current data 
suggest that conservatives’ relative unwillingness to give and accept apologies might present 
an obstacle to intrapsychic health and interpersonal reconciliation. 
20 
 
 We examined two mechanisms through which political conservatism and attitudes 
towards apologies might be connected: SDO (Study 1) and entity beliefs about human nature 
(Studies 1 and 2). The positive link between conservatism and SDO reflects a long-
established effect in the literature (Ho et al., 2015). What is new is the finding that SDO was 
positively associated with a reluctance to apologize, and negatively associated with the 
tendency to reward an apology with forgiveness. We argue that this reflects people’s 
underlying orientations to the importance of reducing or maintaining power inequalities. 
Apologies are widely construed to be a rhetorical vehicle for removing power inequities in 
relationships post-transgression. As such, it makes sense that low-SDO people – who are 
committed to equality – are more likely to provide and reward apologies than higher-SDO 
people, who are comfortable with maintaining power differences. 
 We also theorized that people may be more reluctant to provide apologies the more 
they held entity beliefs about human nature. Given that apologies are often seen as markers of 
character reform or transformation, it seemed plausible that people would be less congenial to 
apologies the more they believe that the people cannot fundamentally change who they are. 
But despite the evidence for an indirect effect displayed in Figure 1, we are cautious in 
concluding that entity beliefs are a major reason for why conservatives are more likely to 
give apologies than liberals. First, the mediating role of entity beliefs emerged reliably in 
only 2 of 9 national samples in Study 1, and was not replicated in Study 2. Second, even in 
Study 1 there was no evidence that entity beliefs mediated the relationship between political 
conservatism and an apology bonus in terms of forgiveness. Together, the results offer only 
limited evidence for the hypothesis that the association between political ideology and the 
willingness to provide and reward apologies is tied to broader beliefs about the capacity for 
transformation. 
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Strengths, limitations and future directions 
 Nine national samples allowed us to test the generalizability of the observed effects 
outside WEIRD samples, which is a strength of the study. However, one challenge of 
examining this question outside WEIRD samples is that the notion of “left” and right” 
ideology has different psychological resonances in different countries. Five of the nations in 
the current samples have communist, post-communist or socialist governments. In China and 
Russia, for example, “left-ist” values may be less tied to “progressive” or “liberal” values, as 
they are in longstanding democracies such as the USA or Australia (Huber & Inglehart, 1995; 
Piurko, Schwartz, & Davidov, 2011). Indeed, in China, Hong Kong, and Russia, the 
correlations between the two indices of political ideology were relatively weak. However, we 
are reassured that the noise attached to our operationalization of political ideology in these 
countries would have worked against our hypotheses rather than for them, meaning that the 
observed effects are unlikely to be artifacts of psychometric issues.  
Of course, the cross-sectional nature of our designs raises the usual questions about 
causality. We can only state with confidence that political ideology and attitudes to apology 
are associated (rather than being linked causally). However, it should be noted that the 
reverse causal path to that shown in Figures 1 and 2 seem less theoretically plausible: it is 
hard to envisage how attitudes specifically about apology could influence broader political 
ideologies, or the other variables of interest (SDO and implicit theories about human nature). 
 Finally, it remains to be seen whether the results would generalize to more public 
apology contexts (e.g., many-to-many apologies). Previously, theorists have cautioned 
against taking conclusions drawn from research on interpersonal contexts and uncritically 
extrapolating it to the collective context (Hornsey & Wohl, 2013; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). 
So although there are theoretical reasons to expect that the link between political ideology 
and apology beliefs would also emerge at the collective level, this link should not be 
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presumed. This is especially the case given that public/collective apologies are often wrapped 
up in political debates about where the boundaries of morality and responsibility lie (Wohl, 
Hornsey, & Philpot, 2011), so whether conservatives or liberals are more likely to want to 
apologize might well depend on the sociopolitical context surrounding a transgression.  
Summary 
 This research uncovered a previously undocumented relationship: Conservatives are 
less likely than liberals to want to provide apologies, and are less likely to reward received 
apologies with forgiveness. These data – and the mediating role of SDO – reinforce 
theorizing that construes apologies as rhetorical tools for diminishing power differences post-
transgression, and suggest that willingness to give and receive apologies may be related to 
individual differences about the desirability of equality as a principle. More broadly, the data 
reinforce how political ideologies infuse how people conduct themselves interpersonally, in 
this case in ways that have implications for interpersonal reconciliation and forgiveness. 
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Notes 
1. Evidence for this latter notion can be extrapolated from the finding that prosocial 
individuals (who typically value equality) behaved more cooperatively in a 
negotiation with a hypothetical colleague who had apologized for an angry outburst 
than with a colleague who had not apologized. In contrast, those low in prosociality 
were more likely to exploit the apologetic counterpart (van Kleef & de Dreu, 2010). 
2. Given the modest internal consistency of the SDO scale, we examined each item 
separately as a potential mediator of the link between political conservatism and the 
criterion variables. Indirect effects described in Figures 1 and 2 remained significant 
when the SDO scale was replaced with any one of its individual items. 
3. The measures were included after a set of questions on people’s folk theories about 
what constituted perfect societies, measures that were designed to answer an unrelated 
research question (the full set of measures is available upon request). Three hundred 
and five participants – who started the questionnaire but dropped out before 
completing any of the measures in the current manuscript – are not counted in the 
reported N for this study.   
4. The model predicting apology bonus was then repeated, but with two different 
methods of operationalizing the change score reflecting the difference between pre-
apology and post-apology forgiveness. First, we regressed the post-apology 
forgiveness scores on the pre-apology forgiveness scores, and used the associated 
standardized residuals as the criterion variable. We then ran a separate model in which 
we used only post-apology forgiveness scores as the criterion variable, but with pre-
apology forgiveness scores included as a covariate. Whichever way the criterion 
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variable was analyzed the effect remained the same: SDO was a significant mediator, 
but entity beliefs were not. 
5. Other measures – for example of self-consciousness, self-esteem, need for cognition, 
and need for closure – were peripheral to hypotheses. Data can be obtained upon 
request from the first author. 
6. Half the participants imagined that the neighbor’s plants were wilting and the foliage 
brown; the other half imagined that the plants were almost all dead and the foliage 
burned. Results were the same regardless of the severity of the consequences 
described in the scenario, so data are reported after collapsing across these conditions. 
